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Germany
In the post-war period right through to the 1970s,
Germany was the growth locomotive of Europe.
That period is long past.Today, Germany brings up
the rear in terms of Europe’s growth. Unemploy-
ment has reached alarming proportions, the num-
ber of business failures has shot up to a record
level and the financial sector is mired in the deep-
est crisis of the post-war period. Investors are stay-
ing away from Germany and are looking for
opportunities elsewhere.
The winds of competition are howling more fiercely
than ever. Globalisation and European integration,
in particular the creation of a single capital market
with the introduction of the euro, have levelled the
playing field for competition between rival business
locations,and the eastward expansion of the EU will
shortly add a further dimension to this levelling
process. The defects of Germany’s economic system
and its resulting weakness as a business location are
now clearly evident and will retard the country still
further.The necessary corrections cannot hope to be
more than an exercise in damage control.
This paper will marshal the facts in order to issue a
warning and to point out ways of reforming the
economic system. First it will present the relevant
findings. Then it will examine the question as to
what can be learned from the oft-quoted compari-
son between Germany and Japan. Next, it will
analyse the particular role
played by the euro and finally it
will look at the home-grown
reasons for the weakness of
Germany’s economy. After all,
economic policy must start
from this basis.
This article is not concerned with business cycle
questions. It will focus exclusively on those aspects
of the economy which are of importance for the
development of our country over the longer term.
Even if the economy were soon to recover, Ger-
many’s problems will not disappear, but will be at
most temporarily concealed. In the event, the
opportunity must be seized to carry out the
reforms which are urged in this paper.
The findings
Germany has been growing more slowly than the
European average,particularly since the mid-1990s
(see Fig. 1).Whereas Great Britain and France
achieved 22 and 19 percent growth, respectively,
above the European average in the period from
1995 to 2003,Germany managed a mere 10 percent
during the same period, far behind everybody,
including Italy. Even if the list of countries were to
be extended to encompass all the member states of
the EU,one would see the same picture confirmed:
Germany is the laggard of Europe.
The latest growth figures show no changes in this
trend either. In 2002, Germany’s output grew only
by 0.2 percent. During this time, average growth
among the EU countries still managed to reach
close to 1 percent.
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1 This paper is a based on Hans-Werner
Sinn, Die rote Laterne, Die Gründe für
die Wachstumsschwäche und die
notwendigen Reformen, ifo Schnelldienst
55, 2002, No. 23, 17 December 2002, spe-
cial issue. Some of the material is also
contained in condensed form in Euro-
pean Economic Advisory Group at
CESifo, Report on the European Eonomy
2003, Ifo Institute for Economic Re-
search: Munich 2003, chapter 1, appen-
dices 4 and 5.A lower growth rate would not constitute a problem
if it merely reflected the process of European con-
vergence.If Germany’s growth were to slacken com-
pared with its European neighbours only because it
had already achieved the high income per capita
which the others were still hoping to reach, there
would be little cause for concern. After all, conver-
gence is the great aim of European unification, and
is also an accepted part of German policy.
However,the reality looks rather different.In 2002
France overtook Germany’s GDP per capita and
Great Britain did so in 2000 (Fig. 2).As recently as
the late 1970s,per-capita GDP in Great Britain had
only just reached half the German figure.
Admittedly, the high GDP per capita recorded for
Great Britain is skewed by the over-valued pound,
but it is remarkable that Britain still continues to
grow at a comparatively fast rate despite the pro-
longed high exchange rate of sterling.
The comparison with Great Britain is important
because the country was, after
the war, in a similar situation to
Germany today.Having won the
war, Britain felt assured of its
prosperity.The welfare state was
set up with confidence and there
was widespread pride in the
country’s unquestioned superi-
ority. Before long, however,
many other European countries,
and particularly Germany, had
overtaken Great Britain. It took
a long time before the British
public was prepared to admit
what had happened and even
then it was a while before the
British crisis could give rise to
the cultural revolution which
Margaret Thatcher pushed
through during her period of
office from 1979 to 1990. The
Thatcherite revolution not only
crushed the British trade unions,
it also helped market forces
break through in many other
sectors of the economy.The costs
of this revolution were consider-
able for the state and society,
and one must certainly warn
against a blind acceptance of the
British model. But it must be
recognised that ten years after
the British reforms, the country
embarked on a period of vigorous economic growth
in whose course it managed to overtake Germany
again. Tony Blair is now reaping the fruits sown by
Margaret Thatcher.
Among the larger countries of the EU, today only
Italy is in a similar situation to Germany.The Italian
economy has also grown very slowly in recent years,
and the country’s per-capita output is still signifi-
cantly below that of Germany. However, it should
not be ignored that a large part of Italy’s domestic
product remains invisible because it is produced in
an extensive underground economy. The true cir-
cumstances in Italy are considerably better than
expressed by the official statistics.
Germany has also been overtaken by a number of
smaller countries, as shown in Figure 3.The develop-
ment of Ireland, a country which entered the EU
quite late, must be particularly highlighted. It has
experienced a truly dramatic boom supported by
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massive capital imports and intensive foreign trade
overtaking Germany in the process.There is evidence
that Ireland’s high economic growth rate is the result
of a restrained wages policy. Even today, Ireland’s
hourly wage rates in the manufacturing sector are a
third lower than those in western Germany.The coun-
try continues to be a highly attractive business loca-
tion for internationally mobile capital.
The Netherlands, too, which suffered a major slump
in the late 1970s and early 1980s and consequently
changed course with a new incomes policy enshrined
in the Wassenaar Agreement of 1982, reaped the
reward a decade later with a resurgence of growth.
As a result, the country’s per-capita income now
exceeds that of Germany. Even Austria, which has
traditionally limped behind, has now overtaken
Germany in terms of per-capita income.2
One sometimes hears that Germany’s exports have
continued to do well.True enough,the German auto-
mobile industry managed to gain market share in the
early 1990s thanks to a dramatic streamlining and
modernisation drive. It is also true that the share of
exports in Germany’s aggregate demand has consis-
tently increased over time. However, none of these
factors must blind the observer to the fact that the
exports of many other countries have grown much
more dynamically. Figure 4 shows that Germany’s
export share has dropped from over 10 percent to
8 percent within just a decade.
It is unemployment which is the main problem trou-
bling the German economy. Just three years ago, the
government was still extremely optimistic that it
could cut unemployment. But this optimism was not
based on any facts which might
have suggested a sustained turn-
around in the trend, but merely
on the assumption that the eco-
nomic upswing then under way
would continue unabated. It was
a mistake to equate a cyclical
development with long-term
structural evolution.
Figure 5 shows with utmost clarity how dramatically
unemployment has risen in Germany in the last three
decades.The country had only 150,000 unemployed in
1970, but this figure has now exploded to over four
million.Even if one leaves eastern Germany out of the
picture,the rise in unemployment has been unbroken.
As the diagram shows, the western German figures
follow a linear rise whose end is still nowhere in sight.
These figures show that Germany is suffering from
fundamental economic problems which remain to be
solved.Unemployment means forgoing the productive
activity of human beings. A valuable resource is
excluded from the production process.Aggregate out-
put is less than what it might be.
The number of unemployed shown in Figure 5 is only
the statistically measured figure. Many unemployed
are not recorded at all because they fail to report
being out of work or are hidden in early-retirement or
retraining programs.The new Job-AQTIV law as well
as the pre-retirement provisions imply that half a mil-
lion people who are in reality out of work are no
Figure 4
Figure 5
2The Scandinavian countries of Denmark,
Sweden and Finland are also ahead of
Germany. These countries are not easily
comparable, as they have an extremely
high employment share in the public sec-
tor compared with Germany, associated
with generally high participation rates.
Salaries in the public sector are financed
via taxation by the value added of the pri-
vate sector. They augment the national
product according to the rules of national
accounting without necessarily implying
higher output.longer recorded as such. To this we must add a large
part of those who receive welfare benefits, now num-
bering 2.9 million, who are mostly not considered as
being unemployed for diverse reasons at various lev-
els of plausibility. So the real picture is far more dra-
matic than Figure 5 shows.
In parallel to the rise in unemployment, there has
been a widespread increase in unreported employ-
ment in Germany. Figure 6 illustrates this develop-
ment.Whereas in 1974 the proportion of the shadow
or underground economy represented only 6 percent
of the official added value, this figure has now risen
to 16 percent.The shadow economy is currently the
only sector still showing vigorous growth.
Is Germany in danger of succumbing to the
Japanese disease? 
Key characteristics of the developments in Germany
resemble those which have already been observed in
Japan over the last decade. Japan is mired in a perma-
nent crisis from which it is apparently unable to extri-
cate itself.The Japanese economy has hardly grown at
all over the last ten years. According to OECD data,
the country’s overall real GDP grew only 6.6 percent
during the seven years from 1995 to 2002,and the econ-
omy even shrank by about 1 percent in 2001 and 2002.
Japan had reached a level of development similar to Ger-
many,and both are ageing industrialised nations.There is
a danger that Japanese conditions will also spread to
Germany. That is why it may be useful to take a closer
look at Japan in order to note the similarities and differ-
ences and to identify dangers in good time which may
then perhaps be averted.3
After the devaluation of the dol-
lar following the US tax reform
of 1986 and the Plaza Agree-
ment, Japan found itself with an
overvalued currency. This con-
siderably weakened the compet-
itiveness of its economy relative
to the newly resurgent Asian
Tiger states.Orders for Japanese
goods declined, followed by a
slump in the economy which in
time merely got bogged down still further in a fun-
damental structural crisis as a result of purely
Keynesian responses.
Banking crisis
The Japanese structural crisis is particularly evident in
the enormous problems suffered by banks.Because of
a growing number of business failures,the banks have
accumulated an ever larger share of bad loans and
have, year by year, slid deeper into a crisis which they
are now almost incapable of resolving on their own.
This aspect of Japanese developments must give
rise to concern in Germany, whose banks and life
insurance companies have also entered a crisis
without parallel in the post-war period. It was trig-
gered by the growing number of business failures,
which are particularly concentrated in east
Germany (see Fig. 26) and have now reached a
record level. As shown in Figure 7, the number of




3 See H.-W.Sinn,“The Japanese Disease”,
Ifo Viewpoints No. 26, June 2001, as well
as ibid. “Der japanische Patient benötigt
mehr als nur Strukturreformen”,
Handelsblatt No. 112, June 13 2001, p. 12.CESifo Special Report 1/2003 7
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business failures is currently three times as high as
even a decade ago.
These insolvencies mean that the German commer-
cial banks must undertake very high valuation
adjustments for bad loans (see Fig.8).In conjunction
with the drop in share prices in the period between
2000 and 2002, these valuation adjustments oblige
German banks and life insurers to restrict their new
loans to the private corporate sector as well as the
acquisition of privately issued bonds generating
close to a general credit crunch. Similarities to the
situation prevailing in Japan in the years 1990 and
1991 are all too obvious, as then, too, the Nikkei
index suffered a dramatic fall similar to the recent
collapse of the DAX. Figure 8 already shows consid-
erable problems for the years 2000 and 2001. The
year 2002 turns out to have been even worse in this
respect.
However, the Japanese crisis had also assumed such
dramatic dimensions because not only share prices
but also real-estate prices had collapsed in Japan at
that time. This development is unlikely in Germany
if only because the culture of long-term mortgage
lending and financing them by issuing mortgage
backed securities implies a much greater stability of
the financing cycle in this country.
Secular stagnation
The bank crises in Japan and Germany are symp-
toms of a deeper malaise plaguing both countries
rather than causes.
In order to identify the underlying causes, other char-
acteristics of these crises must be highlighted.
In the case of Japan,this includes the following cir-
cumstances:
– the country has had a deflationary economy
since 1999, in which goods prices have been
falling,
– short-term interest rates have remained close to
zero for several years now, and 
– the national debt has been inreasing rapidly. (It
rose from 60 percent to 155 percent of GDP
within a decade.) 
These characteristics correspond quite closely to
what Keynesian economist Alvin Hansen called
“secular stagnation” back in 1951.4
Secular stagnation is a situation of chronic underde-
mand for a country’s goods and services. The under-
demand is revealed by saving exceeding investment.
Saving withholds money that would otherwise be
spent. If saving exceeds investment by the corporate
sector, the sum of investment and private consump-
tion is too small to take up overall output. Economic
problems can then only be avoided if the savings sur-
plus goes to the state or is placed abroad, so that the
lack of demand is compensated by the state or foreign
countries. Either the state must live beyond its means
and run up debt,or foreigners must run up debt in the
country by buying more goods there than they sell,
resulting in a current account surplus of the country in
question.
In Japan, the savings surplus is 8.3 percent of GNP.
This results primarily from the exceptional circum-
stance that companies are net savers. As a rule, the
corporate sector is a net borrower. Households’ sav-
ings flow to the companies and are converted into real
investments. In Japan, the situation is reversed.
Companies are not investing. Instead they supply the
financial markets with net funds
in the same way as the house-
holds do. Only a small part of
these funds leaves the country via
a current account surplus:
Japanese prices are no longer
attractive to foreigners, who are
unwilling to buy sufficiently more
than they sell there and to run up
deficits in the required volume.
The lion’s share of the surplus
savings is therefore absorbed by
the state, which thus goes more
deeply into debt each year.
Figure 8
4 A. H. Hansen, Business Cycles and Na-
tional Income, Norton: New York 1951.In 2002,Japan’s budget deficit was 7.2 percent of GNP,
or 4.2 percent higher than the 3 percent threshold set
for Europe by the Maastricht Treaty.Only because the
state lives beyond its means is it possible to stabilise
overall demand and avoid the worst in the short term.
But the consequence is a fast-growing national debt.
This produces a high interest burden which in the long
term generates a considerable financing problem for
the state leading to correspondingly high taxes which
paralyse the economy. Japan will not find it easy to
emerge from this impasse.
One would normally expect interest rates to fall in a
situation of weak demand and reduced money
demand, which would then allow the problem to heal
itself via higher investment. But Japan is already
caught in the liquidity trap with short-term interest
rates close to zero. Monetary policy has become inef-
fective because it could only work by reducing interest
rates.
The situation is aggravated still further by the defla-
tion of goods prices generated by the savings surplus
and the associated demand deficit itself. Deflation
implies a rise in the real labour costs of the compa-
nies. Strong psychological barriers preclude nominal
wages from falling in order to offset this effect.A very
low inflation rate already presents a problem for a
nation’s economy,because there are always individual
companies or sectors of the economy whose worsen-
ing situation requires greater reductions in real wages
than can be achieved by very low inflation. Deflation
aggravates this problem to a considerable degree.
Deflation also increases the real value of business
loans and thus the real interest repayments by the
companies.Such increases in real rates of interest are
inevitable if deflation occurs unexpectedly and real
interest-rate conditions are subsequently aggravat-
ed. But even if deflation had been anticipated in the
credit agreements, real interest rates will rise when
the economy is caught in a liquidity trap so that
nominal interest rates can no
longer fall. This effect also
increases business costs and
aggravates the already precari-
ous position of the companies.A
rise in bankruptcies and a fur-
ther reduction of investment is
the consequence. Because in-
vestment is too low, the savings
surplus increases still further.
Deflation increases, real interest
rates continue to rise and the
resulting effects are reinforced.5
A conceivable way out of this vicious circle would
be to print new money in order to buy dollars and
thus devalue the yen. This would increase exports
and thus stabilise overall demand, make the
Japanese economy competitive again and break
the deflationary spiral. Real interest rates would
fall and investment would revive.
Current policies stand in the way of this solution,
however. The majority groups in parliament also
represent the country’s savers who have built up
their pension provisions with bonds secured at
nominal value. Understandably, the savers have no
particular objection to the current price deflation,
as it does appear to make them richer by the year.
Fortunately, Germany is still pretty far from the sec-
ular stagnation which appears to have gripped Japan.
Table 1 compares the key data of Germany and
Japan.Germany has low growth,but its economy has
not yet begun to shrink. Companies are net borrow-
ers instead of net savers. The savings surplus is a
smaller fraction of GDP than in Japan. The govern-
ment’s net borrowing is also significantly lower.
Above all,the debt ratio,which has reached 155 per-
cent in Japan, is stable in Germany at close to the
Maastricht limit of 60 percent. Interest rates are also
still very much higher than in Japan.
Characteristics of secular stagnation as described by
Alvin Hansen can be discerned in Japan, but not in
Germany. Nevertheless, there is one reason why one
must keep these characteristics in mind.That reason is
the euro. As will be shown below, the euro is causing
adjustment problems for Germany and is constraining
Germany’s economic policy. This situation shows sur-
prising parallels to that of Japan.
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Table 1
Comparison of Japan and Germany (December 2002)
in %
Japan Germany
Inflation 2002 – 1.4 1.4
Real GDP growth 2002 – 0.5 0.2
Companies are net savers net borrowers
Savings surplus/GDP 2002 8.3 5.0
Budget deficit/GDP 2002 7.2 3.8
Debt/GDP ratio 1992 60.0 43.1
Debt/GDP ratio 2002 155.0 60.9
Central Bank rate 2002 0.1 2.75
5 When nominal interest rates are flexible, national real interest
rates always tend to approach the level of those in the global capi-
tal markets. However, this trend is interrupted when the economy
is caught in a liquidity trap. The national interest rate will then
rather tend to drift upwards away from the global level.CESifo Special Report 1/2003 9
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The euro: an opportunity for Europe, a risk for
Germany
The euro will bring Europe many advantages. It cre-
ates price transparency in the markets, reduces trans-
action costs for international trade and above all cre-
ates a unified European capital market by freeing
cross-border capital movements from exchange-rate
risks. All this will mean progress for Europe.
Nevertheless problems of transition can be expected
as Europe adapts its economic structures to the euro,
and these will affect Germany in particular.
Taking the dangers of deflation seriously
Among the possible transition problems that must be
discussed is deflation on the Japanese pattern.Another
important parallel between Germany and Japan lies in
the fact that the German government has given up con-
trol of monetary policy, and in accordance with
Maastricht debt rules has for all parctical purposes lost
any scope for an independent fiscal policy.In Japan,the
combination of high debt and the liquidity trap limits
the central bank’s room for manoeuvre. In Germany
the voluntary submission to the EU rules has a similar
implication.The German government would therefore
be powerless to stem deflation if it were to come.
The entire responsibility for controlling German eco-
nomic activity and avoiding the danger of deflation
now lies in the hands of the European Central Bank
and ist interest rate policy. For a very long time, the
ECB stuck fast to a high short-term interest rate of
3.25 percent while its American counterpart had cut
interest rates to 1.75 percent and then to 1.25 percent.
Following the US Fed,the ECB cut its rate to 2.75 per-
cent in early December 2002 and to 2.5 percent in early
March 2003. The central bank, however, has given no
indication of being willing to work proactively against
deflation, which affects only a part of the euro area.
Germany has not yet experienced any deflation in
the prices of consumer goods.However,the inflation
rate is extremely low.The consumer price index rose
only by 1.3 percent in 2002, and the prices of manu-
factured goods even declined by 0.5 percent against
2001. It is still too early to draw conclusions from
these figures,but we must be alert.In any case,there
is absolutely no truth in equating the euro with infla-
tion, a widespread response by a dismayed German
public shortly after the introduction of the euro.The
dangers lie entirely elsewhere.
Deflation would be problematic for Germany,
because rising real interest rates and real wages
would further increase the already alarming num-
ber of business failures. Low inflation is harmless,
whereas low deflation would be a catastrophe.This
asymmetry is sometimes overlooked.
The Balassa-Samuelson effect
The danger of deflation exists in Germany due to the
Balassa-Samuelson effect.Germany has a structurally
lower inflation rate than most other countries, whose
wages and prices are still in the process of catching
up.6 As Figure 9 shows, France is in a similar situation
to Germany. Countries with lower wages have low
prices for local services and other non-traded goods
so that their average price levels are also lower.In the
course of the real economic convergence to be
expected in Europe over the next few decades, prices
and wages in all the countries concerned will also con-
verge. For this reason, their inflation rates cannot be
the same. In the first three years of monetary union,
the German inflation rate averaged about 2.3 per-
centage points below Ireland’s and some 1.5 points
below Portugal’s. The gap between the French and
Irish inflation rates was as high as 2.7 percentage
points.These gaps will narrow at some point, but the
euro countries will have to continue living with them
for the foreseeable future.
The convergence of prices and wages does not mere-
ly run in parallel with real economic convergence,it is
even caused by the latter. Because the economically
less advanced countries have higher growth rates of
labour productivity than the more developed ones,
real wages rise more quickly there,too.The rise in real
wage rates is passed on to the national inflation rate
via corresponding rises in the prices of local services
and rents.As shown below, the unified capital market
created by the euro also contributes to the accelera-
tion of real convergence by causing interest rates to
converge.To this extent, the introduction of the euro
increases the differences in the inflation rates of the
various countries, which are the underlying cause of
the danger of deflation for Germany when the ECB
targets the average inflation rate.
Problems for the policies of the European Central Bank
The structural differences in the inflation rates of the
European countries mean that no monetary policy
6The danger of deflation for Germany was discussed by H.-W.Sinn
and M. Reutter, “The Minimum Inflation Rate for Euroland”,
CESifo Working Paper 377, December 2000, and “Die Min-
destinflationsrate für die Euro-Länder”, Ifo Schnelldienst 53, 2000,
No. 35-36, pp. 23–26.could in principle assure price stability for all of
them.Although “one size fits all” must be the slogan
of the European Central Bank’s governing council,
structural conflicts between the various national rep-
resentatives are evident. The public announcements
of harmony among the members of the ECB’s gov-
erning council have become part of the European
reason of state, but they are not convincing.
Each member of the ECB’s governing council has
one vote irrespective of the size of the country
which he represents.This arrangement means that
the position of the French representative can
already be countered by that of his Irish col-
league, despite the fact that Ireland has less than
a fifteenth the population of France. Under these
conditions, the decisive weight in the voting is
exercised by those countries lying close to the
mid-position. As shown in Figure 9, in terms of
inflation rates these are currently Italy and
Finland. The number of countries which have a
higher inflation rate than these two is just as large
as the number having a lower rate.Assuming that
all countries have the same inflation target, a
monetary policy will be selected which suits the
median countries, as there is no majority for any
other policy.
From a German point of view, there is justified
concern that the European Central Bank is orient-
ed too strongly toward the interests of the smaller
euro area countries like Ireland, Portugal or the
Netherlands, which are trying to bring their struc-
tural inflation under control. From a German
standpoint, the disproportional weight of the small
countries then leads to an over-
ly restrictive interpretation of
the ECB’s stability targets.
Officially, the ECB has set the
upper limit of the tolerated
average inflation rate at only
2 percent. This is too low for
Germany and France, as it
pushes these countries too
close to the brink of deflation.
That is why some economists
call for this value to be in-
creased by at least half a per-
centage point.7
The ECB should abandon its pol-
icy of looking only at the mean
inflation rate.The process of eco-
nomic adjustment of the coun-
tries within the European Monetary System is still far
from complete. During this adjustment process, it
makes sense to exercise a considerable degree of tol-
erance with respect to inflation in countries such as
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland or the Netherlands,
whose wages and prices are still catching up. If these
countries have higher inflation rates than the average,
this is no reason for concern, but merely a sign of a
necessary adjustment of relative prices across nation-
al borders. An upward deviation from the average
European inflation rate is nowhere nearly as bad as a
downward deviation. As long as it is based on the
Balassa-Samuelson effect and not on an overheating
of the economy, it should be allowed to continue for
allocative reasons. The asymmetry of the economic
consequences of an upward and downward deviation
prohibits keeping one’s gaze fixed only on averages
and pursuing ambitious stability targets. Orientation
on mere averages may well make sense later on when
the European countries have converged more strong-
ly and no longer exhibit such large differences in their
inflation rates as is still the case today. But Europe is
still very far from having reached this stage.
This applies in particular when considering the
extension of the single currency to the countries of
eastern Europe which. will happen in the foresee-
able future. The Balassa-Samuelson effect will then
become even more significant. Germany and France
would very likely be forced into deflation if the new-
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7 See for example P.de Grauwe,“The Euro at Stake? The Monetary
Union in an Enlarged Europe”, CESifo Forum 3, 2002, , pp. 58-62;
European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo, Report on the
European Economy 2002, CESifo: Munich 2002, Chapter 4, as well
as Sinn and Reutter op. cit.
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comers were to enter EMU
quickly and the ECB were to
insist on stability targets orient-
ed on average inflation.
Incidentally, the impending
eastward enlargement of the
EU makes it urgently necessary
to change the internal decision-
making structure of the ECB
even before then so that the
voting rights of the large coun-
tries on the ECB’s governing
council correspond to their
economic weight. A rotation of
the smaller member states or
the principle of a dual simple
majority are current suggestions.8
Interest-rate convergence
Among the real effects of introducing the euro in
Europe, the creation of a single capital market and the
associated convergence of interest rates is probably the
most important. Figure 10 illustrates this development.
Whereas long-term interest rates in Europe still dif-
fered from each other by 5 to 6 percentage points in the
mid-1990s,they have now converged almost completely.
The convergence already began in the run-up to mone-
tary union and had reduced the gaps between interest
rates to a few dozen basis points as early as 1998.
Before the euro was announced and introduced, a
considerable degree of uncertainty prevailed
regarding the exchange rates of some countries.
This had led to high interest rates in the capital-
poor countries because lenders had to be compen-
sated in the form of high risk premia in the interest
rates for their willingness to make funds available.
The introduction of the euro and the elimination of
exchange-rate uncertainty have led to the disap-
pearance of these risk premia.
This is a great advantage for those countries which
had been disadvantaged by high interest rates. They
have now gained access to the more favourable
financing conditions which had previously been the
sole preserve of German companies.This levelling of
the playing field of competition is a desirable result of
European integration and a prerequisite for prosper-
ity and growth in Europe. Scarce investment capital
can now migrate, unhindered by exchange-rate bar-
riers, to where it can earn the highest return and thus
make a maximum contribution to European GDP.
For this reason the euro will boost Europe’s growth.
Desirable though this growth boost may be, we must
be aware of the fact that with the introduction of the
euro Germany has been deprived of an important
competitive edge in the form of its low interest rates.
The growth boom will occur in the more peripheral
and hitherto disadvantaged countries, but will bypass
Germany.Depending on how effectively the euro area
remains separated from the rest of the world by any
remaining exchange-rate uncertainty, Germany must
even fear that a considerable part of the capital invest-
ed in the periphery will not migrate there from the rest
of the world, but will originate from savings which
would otherwise have been invested in Germany.
This case is illustrated in Figure 11 by a simple
model.9 It is based on a given European capital
stock available after ten years. The abscissa shows
capital invested in Germany from right to left and
that in the rest of the euro area from left to right.
The downward sloping curve represents the mar-
ginal productivity of capital (MPK) in the rest of
the euro area and the upward sloping curve (which
actually slopes down from right to left) MPK in
Germany.10 Companies in each of these areas
invest up to the point where the marginal produc-
Figure 10
8 H. Berger, “The ECB and Euro-Area Enlargement”, IMF
Working Paper 02/175, October 2002; P. de Grauwe, loc.cit.
9 See also H.-W. Sinn and R. Koll, “Der Euro, die Zinsen und das
europäische Wirtschaftswachstum”, Ifo Schnelldienst 53, 2000,
No. 35-36, pp. 46–47.
10 The marginal productivity of capital corresponds to the maxi-
mum interest rate which just allows an additional real investment
project to remain profitable. The marginal productivity curve
declines with increasing investment because available projects are
ranked by the maximum interest rates which each of them can just
tolerate.The marginal productivity is defined here inclusive of the
own return on the capital invested in the form of the rate of price
increase of the capital goods. Cf. R. Dorfman, R.M. Solow and P.A.
Samuelson, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis,
McGraw-Hill: New York 1958.tivity of capital equals the interest rate. That is
where earnings are maximised.
In the absence of the euro, the capital stocks of
the various countries would still have been sub-
ject to different profitability requirements be-
cause of divergent interest rates.An allocation of
European savings very favourable for Germany
would have continued. Low interest rates would
have kept considerable capital tied up in Ger-
many.This would have benefited the factors which
complement capital, in particular labour, which
would also have been able to achieve high rates of
remuneration. By way of contrast, the introduc-
tion of the euro leads to the formation of a single
rate of interest, as is shown in Figure 11 by the
blue arrows.This was shown empirically in Figure
10.The convergence of interest rates also leads to
the convergence of marginal capital productivities
in the various countries. More will be invested in
those countries in which interest rates fall and less
in Germany than would have been the case with-
out the euro. The financial markets ensure that
funds are allocated accordingly. This process of
reallocating the capital stock can currently be
observed on a large scale in Europe. It will be the
determine the development of the euro area
economy during the next decade.
It is already apparent today that Germany’s large
institutional investors are increasingly transfer-
ring their funds to formerly disadvantaged coun-
tries.Whereas the volume of credit is shrinking in
Germany,Spain for example is experiencing rapid
growth in bank loans, and markets for long-term
fixed-interest loans are developing there for the
first time. The stipulations of the German regula-
tors that German life insurance companies may
invest their funds only in the same currency area
have acquired a completely new meaning with the
introduction of the single currency.Investments in
Spain, Portugal or Ireland now automatically
belong to the category of permitted investments.
This shift of investment capital creates obvious
drawbacks for the incomes of the production fac-
tors complementary to capital in Germany.
Employees, especially unskilled workers, will be
among the losers of the process of European inte-
gration.
Nevertheless, one should not draw the conclusion
from all this that the introduction of the euro is dis-
advantageous for Europe.The opposite is the case,
as can be easily seen from Figures 12 and 13.
The areas under the marginal productivity curves
equal the relevant values of GDP. In the absence
of the euro,European interest rates would remain
different: the yellow and blue areas show
schematically how large GDP would be in
Germany and the rest of Europe with this distrib-
ution of the capital stock.With the introduction of
the euro, in contrast, a part of the capital which
would otherwise have been invested in Germany
is shifted to the other European countries. This
increases GDP there and reduces it in Germany –
always compared with the level of GDP otherwise
attained in a decade.As can be seen in Figure 13,
the yellow area becomes larger and the blue one
smaller. As GDP growth in the other euro area
countries exceeds the decline in Germany, on bal-
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ance there is a net growth boost for Europe as a
whole.11,12
The effects illustrated in this way will be of consid-
erable quantitative importance for Europe and will
boost its growth for many years. Economic conver-
gence will be promoted by the introduction of the
euro,and growth will accelerate in a sustained way.
The euro will contribute to creating the flourishing
Europe envisaged by the founding fathers of the
European Union. The only blemish in this picture
is that Germany will share in this flourishing
Europe only to a very limited degree, if at all.
Did Germany join the euro with an overvalued
currency?
As already mentioned, Japan’s problems were trig-
gered by the devaluation of the US dollar in the wake
of the tax reform of 1986 and the Plaza Agreement.
No less a personage than Milton Friedman has recent-
ly espoused the thesis that Germany suffers from a
similar overvaluation of its currency.13 In his view the
exchange rate of the euro is too high for Germany,
which is the main reason for the country’s economic
woes. This problem can be linked to reunification.
Germany needed the currency revaluation of 1992, as
it was the only way of creating a current account
deficit which permitted the import of the resources
needed to supply the needs of the country’s new citi-
zens.14 However, the revaluation should only have
been temporary. In the longer term, after domestic
production had recovered and the situation had nor-
malised, the value of the deutschmark should have
been adjusted downwards, but this step was fore-
stalled by the introduction of the euro. Because the
latter was too hasty, an inappropriate exchange rate
was permanently fixed. Today Germany suffers from
excessively high prices and wages and is consequent-
ly losing its competitiveness.
Figure 14 shows that this view is not unjustified. In
fact, the decline of the trade-weighted real exchange
rate of countries like Finland,
Sweden or Italy, which occurred
in the wake of the EMS collapse
in 1992, has not been corrected.
Within the euro area, German
12 It should be stressed in this context
that the capital shifts reduce only
German GDP, not GNP. The capital
which Germans now invest abroad yields
income which is also part of German
GNP. However, the factors complemen-
tary to capital, in particular labour, do
not benefit from this income.
13 See M. Friedman, “Deutschland
braucht eine Dosis Deflation”,Interview,
Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 27,
2002, No. 274, p. 25.
14 See also H.-W.Sinn, “International
Implications of German Unification”, in:
A. Razin and E. Sadka (editors), The
Economics of Globalization, Cambridge




11 The analysis assumes that German interest rates will rise in the
medium term because flexible exchange rates between the euro
and the rest of the world effectively isolate the capital markets and
Europe’s capital stock remains unaffected by the euro. To the
degree that the German interest rate is kept constant via an inter-
est-rate link with the world outside of Europe instead, the intro-
duction of the euro is followed by inward migration of capital from
the rest of the world.In the extreme case of a constant interest rate,
this migration means that the left vertical line shifts to the left
together with the marginal productivity curve of the other euro
area countries until the intersection of this curve with the marginal
productivity curve for Germany reaches the previous German
interest-rate level.The rise in European GDP is then even greater
and German GDP does not fall. The introduction of the euro
results in a relative but not absolute disadvantage for German com-
petitiveness. The reality lies between the extreme of a constant
interest rate and the other extreme of a given capital stock for the
euro area countries.goods are more expensive today compared with
those of other countries than in the period before
1992. This has worsened Germany’s competitive
position.
It should not be overlooked, however, that
Germany’s competitive position relative to the
Netherlands and especially France, Germany’s
most important trade partner, has hardly changed
at all. In fact, Germany has been able to gain price
advantages vis-à-vis other countries, especially the
United States and United Kingdom, whose curren-
cies have greatly appreciated since then.No partic-
ular effect can consequently be discerned with
respect to Germany’s trade partners as a whole, as
the figure shows.The effective real exchange rate is
still lower than in 1990 even in the second quarter
of 2002,i.e.after the appreciation of the euro in the
first half of the year.
It is true, nevertheless, that the overvaluation the-
sis may gain credibility if the euro continues to
strengthen. In view of the euro’s growing popular-
ity as a currency for international transactions and
the extremely high American current account
deficit of about 4 percent of GDP, this develop-
ment can even be expected. The consequence
could well be deflationary problems of the kind
currently plaguing the Japanese economy.
Quite apart from that, overvaluation definitely
applies to Germany’s wage levels.The analysis will
now turn to this topic.
The home-grown reasons for weak growth
Germany can no longer influ-
ence the exchange rate of its
currency directly,and it would
be pointless to mourn the
competitive advantage which
the deutschmark had given
German companies in the
capital markets. The benefi-
cial effects of the creation of a
unified European capital
market cannot be questioned
by a good European even if
Germany is unable to profit
from it. So it is important to
clarify the home-grown rea-
sons for Germany’s weak
growth which are still amen-
able to influence. These circumstances may per-
haps have been tolerable before the introduction
of the euro, European integration, the eastward
enlargement of the EU and globalisation gave a
much keener edge to the winds of competition.The
circumstances have changed.
The problem of high wages
Wage levels are usually among the main reasons
for a country’s poor growth performance.A partic-
ular business location will grow only if it promises
profits to investors, and profits are created only if
production costs are sufficiently low. The most
important costs are labour costs. They account for
the lion’s share of the location-dependent costs of
a country’s business sector.The costs of intermedi-
ate products that appear to be important from a
business perspective are also to a large extent
determined by domestic labour costs and to the
extent they are not they reflect the cost of capital
and the cost of imports that are roughly the same
for all competing countries.
German labour costs are at the top in an interna-
tional comparison. Figure 15 shows the develop-
ment of hourly wage rates for workers in the
manufacturing sector in Germany and its main
neighbouring countries, all calculated at the pre-
vailing exchange rates. The labour cost curve for
western Germany lies at the upper end of the
range of all the curves. Hourly rates of pay in the
manufacturing sector are higher in Germany than
anywhere else in the world, including all those
countries not shown in the graph. Even Switzer-
land does not have higher hourly wage rates than
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Germany. The high incomes enjoyed by workers
there are largely earned by working long hours.
Important competitors such as France or Great
Britain have labour costs which are about a quar-
ter below German levels, although these countries
have now caught up with or overtaken Germany in
terms of GDP per capita (see Fig. 2) and do not
have undervalued currencies in comparison to
Germany (see Fig. 14). Other competitors such as
Sweden and Italy have been able to achieve con-
siderable labour-cost advantages by devaluing
their currencies in 1992 and 1993.This is the effect
which Milton Friedman had referred to.
It is particularly remarkable that Ireland, which has
already overtaken Germany in terms of GDP per
capita, still has labour costs which are nearly 40 per-
cent lower.This is likely to be the main explanation
of the Irish economic miracle. Eastern Germany, in
particular, can learn from the Irish example regard-
ing the origin of its growth problems.
A country can successfully compete for investment
despite high labour costs if these higher costs are
exactly balanced by higher productivity. If the pro-
ductivity of the companies at a German location
exceeds that at foreign locations by precisely the
same amount as German wages exceed foreign ones,
then the high level of German labour costs can be
defended and there is no cause for concern. It is
doubtful, however, that this condition still holds.15
High unemployment sends out an unambiguous mes-
sage: the unemployed are not competitive because
they are too expensive relative to their productivity.
This does not mean that Ger-
many no longer has any pro-
ductivity edge over its competi-
tors.The close interdependence
of German industry, the coun-
try’s good infrastructure, the
language and an effficient legal
system can explain and justify certain differences
in productivity and wage levels.But its competitors
are catching up and it is becoming increasingly dif-
ficult for Germany to defend its old wage differen-
tial.When west German companies establish them-
selves elsewhere, they bring their know-how along
with them and can often operate at their new loca-
tion with the same productivity they achieve in
Germany. The migration of companies from
Germany is the oft-bemoaned consequence.
Germany could justify its high wages at a time when
it was able to enjoy the benefits of its large domestic
market.Thirty, even twenty years ago, Germany was
an incomparably better location for industrial mass
production than Belgium, the Netherlands or
Ireland, because these countries did not have the
market size which allowed productivity gains to be
achieved by means of large-scale industrial produc-
tion.With the creation of a single European market,
however,this edge is long gone.Every location with-
in the EU today can benefit from a large domestic
market, and the small countries benefit particularly
from this situation. One of the main reasons for
Germany’s productivity edge has gone, but unions
and management do not seem to have noticed. The
location problems of Germany due to high wages
will get worse when the European Union is enlarged
by another ten countries in 2004.As shown in Figure
16, most of these countries have extremely low
labour costs of not even a sixth of the west German
level.Apart from that, they have a well-trained pool
of skilled workers and are located in Germany’s
immediate neighbourhood. One does not need to be
an economist to recognise that Germany’s inability
to attract investment will grow into an extremely
15 In the development of unit labour costs
(hourly pay rates divided by labour pro-
ductivity) Germany also has moved quite
significantly above the European aver-
age. However, unit labour costs should
only be seen as a useful indicator of com-
petitiveness if the labour productivity
used to calculate them is adjusted by the
change in productivity due to lay-offs.
This is that part of the rise in labour pro-
ductivity which can be explained by the
fact that wage increases destroy less pro-
ductive jobs and force companies to
replace human labour by machines.
Comparisons of unit labour costs tend to
abound in analytical arbitrariness.
Figure 16troublesome structural crisis of the entire German
economy if no immediate and far-reaching measures
are taken to build greater flexibility into the German
labour market. A large part of the poor investment
performance already observed in Germany is
probably due to the fact that companies do not
expect such a move towards greater flexibility and
thus draw the consequences at an early stage.
If Germany wants to compete successfully with the
accession countries of eastern Europe, the country’s
wages need not drop to a sixth of their present level.
But they will have to decline to some extent, espe-
cially in the area of unskilled and semi-skilled work,
and no-one knows exactly by how much. Only if the
process of wage-determination is made more flexible
can the labour market find the right balance here.
If the labour market does not become more flexi-
ble, we can expect three kinds of reactions. All of
them would have more unpleasant consequences
for German employees than more flexible wages.
Firstly, foreign workers will enter the country and
edge German workers into unemployment.
Bavaria is already experiencing this effect as a
result of intra-German migration. The Bavarian
unemployment rate, still the next lowest after that
of Baden-Württemberg among all western German
states, has recently risen rather sharply.This rise is
almost entirely due to migration. The flow of
migrants from the eastern German states,above all
Thuringia and Saxony, is particularly large.A simi-
lar picture will be repeated throughout the Federal
Republic when migration from the Eastern
European accession countries begins.
Secondly, shifts of manufacturing facilities by
German companies to the new EU member coun-
tries in the East will increase, in order to take
advantage of lower labour costs there. Germany’s
mid-size companies have already established them-
selves in Eastern Europe and their investment pro-
jects are waiting only for the starting shot of the
EU’s eastward enlargement. The capital which is
invested in the East is lost to the Federal Republic.
Thirdly, the East European countries will also focus
their own energies on the production of labour-
intensive goods in order to exploit their lower labour
costs to their competitive advantage.High-tech com-
panies in Germany need not fear this development,
but the country’s labour-intensive enterprises will
come under particularly high pressure and unem-
ployment will rise for these reasons, too.
None of this would happen, or at least not to the
same degree,if wages in Germany were to decline.In
that case unemployment would not rise,and business
locations would remain attractive to mobile interna-
tional capital.Although declines in real wages would
not spare German employees the negative implica-
tions of this redistribution, we would not see the
chaotic and crisis-like developments which threaten
as the result of widespread unemployment.
In the long term, Germany can exploit its geo-
graphic position to create new growth and a flour-
ishing economy.The advantages of such a develop-
ment will then also become apparent to the labour
force at large. The prerequisite for this scenario is
an energetic turnaround in wage policy.
It is sometimes argued that higher rather than
lower wages are needed in order to revive the
economy and thus create jobs. This is the purchas-
ing-power argument. The higher the wages, it
asserts, the greater the demand of private house-
holds and the higher the demand for products of
the business sector.More can be manufactured and
thus more jobs are created by the firms.
The chain of argument enjoys a certain popularity in
naïve discussions. But it is wrong and misleading
because it neglects the fact that higher wages mean
reduced profit expectations of the business sector
and thus a reduced demand for capital goods. In
most cases, this response over-compensates the posi-
tive effect of higher wages on private consumption.
The chain of argument is also misleading because it
creates the impression that unemployment
depends on demand effects in the long term as
well. In reality, the long-term development of a
nation’s economy is determined only by an
increase in the supply of goods, which essentially
depends on investment. The reduction of invest-
ment because of higher wages means that fewer
jobs are created and production capacity is ex-
panded less quickly. Unemployment and reduced
economic growth are the consequences.
Figure 17 illustrates this relationship by comparing
long-term economic developments in Germany,
the Netherlands and the United States. 1982 was
selected as the reference year, as that was the year
when the Wassenaar Agreement was concluded
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between the collective-bargaining partners and the
Dutch government introducing a policy of long-
term wage restraint.
Within a period of almost twenty years (the last
reporting year in the diagram is 2001), real labour
costs in the Dutch manufacturing industry rose by
about 23 percent, whereas the German rise was
almost 40 percent and US costs had remained prac-
tically constant.The growth of labour volume (mea-
sured by the number of total hours worked) fol-
lowed an exactly inverse pattern.Whereas the labour
volume rose by about 37 percent in the United
States and by 26 percent in the Netherlands,western
Germany suffered a contraction of 3 percent. This
also confirms the rule of thumb confirmed by econo-
metric studies that a 1 percent reduction in wages
relative to another country means at least a 1 per-
cent increase in employment over the long term.
As regards the impact on employment, it is less
important whether the results of a particular year’s
wage negotiations exceed or fall below the usual tar-
get, defined by the sum of productivity and price
increases, by one percentage point. Such small
changes are insignificant. But if the target is exceed-
ed by a percentage point every year for twenty years,
then a problem arises, as can be seen in the diagram.
As slowly as the problem grew to its present dimen-
sion, as great will be the difficulties to resolve it by
wage restraint. In view of the new competitive con-
ditions, however, there really is no alternative.
Only a course of modest restraint in future wage
negotiations resulting at least in lower increases but
perhaps even in a reduction of real wages, can pre-
vent the shift of business loca-
tions and capital flight. Such a
course can only be implemented
by changing the institutional
environment of the labour mar-
ket, and it would certainly be
facilitated by the willingness of
the European Central Bank to
interpret its inflation target in a
somewhat broader way than
hitherto. This has already been
discussed and the relevant
action urged. In contrast, a mon-
etary policy which exposes
Germany to the constant danger
of deflation would impair the
healing of the German disease.16
A high tax burden
It is a well-known fact that one reason for Ger-
many’s high labour costs is the high tax burden
levied on labour.The tax burden on capital has been
sharply reduced by the tax reform of 2000, but the
tax burden on labour continues to be high.Although
the planned reduction of income tax rates, as enact-
ed in 2001, would have eased the burden somewhat,
it was deferred because of the flood damage in east
Germany.
The marginal value added produced by the average
German employee must bear a marginal tax rate of
almost 66 percent. Two thirds of whatever he pro-
duces by additional effort goes to the state. If the
extra effort of a skilled worker creates r1,000 of
additional output which his employer can realise
by selling it, and if the employer makes no further
deductions for other purposes, then employer and
employee together must pay r656 to the state and
just r334 are left in the employee’s pocket. No
wonder that unreported work is gaining ground
and do-it-yourself markets are booming.When cus-
tomer and tradesman get together they save r656,
and if the customer does the work himself, he can
take three times as long as the tradesman before
the job becomes uneconomical for him.
Figure 17
16 The policy of wage restraint can be interpreted as a real devalu-
ation of the German currency, as Friedman urges. The analogy to
devaluation is, however, imperfect to the extent that a true curren-
cy devaluation may not reduce real wages in units of domestic pro-
duction at all.A devaluation has no effect on the labour market if
goods prices are determined abroad via the international interrela-
tionship of prices and the unions defend real wage targets.
Employment can only rise if real wages are reduced.This aim can
only be reached if the institutional environment of the labour mar-
ket and the welfare state is changed and will be difficult without the
aid of an accommodating monetary policy.Germany has probably the highest marginal tax rate
of all the OECD countries. Even welfare states such
as Sweden and the Netherlands impose a smaller tax
burden on labour. Figure 18 compares the German
situation with conditions in the United States, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the
Netherlands, i.e. with countries with liberal econom-
ic systems and those known to be welfare states.
The marginal taxation imposed on the value added
is in all cases calculated in the same way.It consists
of the income taxes payable by the employee, the
employee’s and employer’s social insurance contri-
butions and the value added tax or equivalent
taxes like the US retail sales tax. Such indirect
taxes must be included because they are levied on
the employer and are a charge against the value
added generated by the additional input of labour.
Just like direct taxes, they drive people into unre-
ported work or to the do-it-yourself markets.
The German public sector share in gross domestic
product (GDP) has risen in parallel to the high tax
burden.This ratio measures the proportion of total
government expenditure in GDP. Figure 19 shows
that it still stood at 39 percent in 1970 and then
rose to almost 50 percent at the time when the
coalition of social democrats and liberals was in
power. In 2001 it was a little above 48 percent.
Considering that GDP contains the depreciation of
a country’s capital stock, this figure already corre-
sponds to a public sector share of over 50 percent
in distributable net national product.
The new decisions taken by the recently re-elected
government coalition have increased taxes in many
points and aim to increase gov-
ernment revenues still further.
Although a certain reluctance
can currently be expected due
to the Maastricht limit, it is to
be feared that in the medium
term this will also increase the
government share in GDP.
The education problem: false
priorities
A well-known explanation for
the problems of the German
economy is neglect of education.
If education is poor, labour pro-
ductivity will also be low, and
low labour productivity associat-
ed with ambitious wage targets leads to unemploy-
ment. In addition, neglect of the educational system
slows down technological progress, which has imme-
diate consequences for economic growth. Germans
must upgrade their performance if they are to be jus-
tified in being as expensive as they are.
The urgency of this problem was clearly revealed by
the PISA study run by the OECD. Germany spends
far too little on education and thus performed poorly
throughout all categories in the international compar-
ative tests. Figure 20 shows how little Germany
spends on education. Germany even lies below the
OECD average,with a share of government spending
on education of only 4.3 percent of GDP. In terms of
public education expenditure, Germany even lags
behind the United States,whose educational system is
organised to a much larger extent on a private basis.
The overly low spending has obvious implications
for the quality of German scholastic performance.
CESifo Special Report 1/2003 18
Germany
Figure 18
Figure 19CESifo Special Report 1/2003 19
Germany
Figure 21 shows the result of a performance com-
parison in mathematics, a subject whose results are
least distorted by cultural differences and language
barriers. As can be seen, the nation of poets and
thinkers has slid to one of the bottom positions,not
only in terms of education spending but also
regarding the level of educational performance
achieved with this funding, which is significantly
below the average of all the OECD countries.
The poor scholastic performance is probably affected
by the insufficient integration of immigrants. For
nowhere else was the gap in performance between the
best and worst students as large as in Germany. The
great problem lies in the non-selective nature of some
secondary schools at which most of the children of
immigrants are educated. If Ger-
many does not succeed in inte-
grating the children of immi-
grants into its high-performance
society by assuring them a good
education, it creates an encum-
brance for the future and a social
problem of the first order.
Important though the improve-
ment of education is, one should
not overlook the fact that it will
take many years before it makes
a noticeable impact on the
labour market. Indeed, it will
take decades before quantita-
tively significant effects will
emerge from which faster eco-
nomic growth for Germany can be expected.
Nevertheless, Germany must reconsider its public
spending priorities.Does it really make sense to spend
no more than 4.3 percent of GDP on investment in the
country’s human capital, while 27.3 percent flows into
social expenditures? And does Germany really want
to be positioned way below the OECD average in
terms of its share of education spending in GDP,while
at the same time being at the very top in terms of the
share of social spending (Fig. 22)? 
The demographic problem
To neglect education means to invest too little in
human capital.To invest too lit-
tle in human capital may also
mean having too few children.
And this, too, is a German
problem.
Germany is particularly affected
by the demographic problem
which is giving all industrialised
countries a headache. Life
expectancy is rising and the
number of births declining. The
dramatic nature of the situation
is evident from Figure 23, which
compares the age pyramid at the
time of Bismarck with the pyra-
mid in 1999, which no longer
deserves its name. Instead of a
pyramid one would have to
speak about a bush-like figure
which bears a distant resem-
Figure 20
Figure 21blance to a Christmas tree.The thick branches of the
tree extend outwards at the cohorts approaching
forty. These are the most heavily populated age
groups. In 30 years, they will have reached retire-
ment age, and it will then be difficult to meet their
pension claims. The cohorts which follow are
extremely small.The size of the cohorts between 20
and 30 years of age is around 40 percent below that
of the cohort approaching forty.
In 30 years’ time,the ratio of old to young will have at
least doubled, irrespective of where one decides to
draw the age limit. The contribution rate for pension
insurance would have to increase
from 20 percent to 40 percent if
pensions were kept constant in
relation to gross incomes in
accordance with the pension for-
mula that was applicable until
1992. And vice-versa, pensions
would have to be cut by half if
the contribution rate were to be
kept at its present level of around
20 percent. The government will
have to pick a point within this
range. But whatever is done, a
major crisis of the pension insur-
ance system cannot be avoided if
it continues to be based solely on
contributions by the young to
support the old.
In recent years politics appears
to have focused on asymmetrical
pension reductions under the slogan of “a basic pen-
sion”, which means that those who have paid above-
average contributions will be particularly hit by pen-
sion cuts. The drawback of such a reform is that it
abandons Germany’s system of individual accounts
and introduces a new redistribution element. The
high pension contribution rates were hitherto at
least partially accepted by the employees, because
they knew that they would result in higher pension
claims. The incentive of changing from regular to
unreported work was countered by the wish to
secure pensions. All this would be jeopardised with
the changeover to a system of
basic pensions, because the con-
tributions would then represent
pure taxes with no equivalent
benefits in return. Reference to
Switzerland, which has such a
system of basic pensions, is not a
good justification either,because
Switzerland also has very low
taxes. What low-tax Switzerland
can afford could easily become a
fiasco in Germany.
The fact that Sweden has
recently abandoned its basic
pensions system and has under-
taken a major program of pen-
sion reform, introducing Ger-
man-style contributions equiva-
lence as well as a partial fund-
ing, should be further food for
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thought. It would be ridiculous for Germany to
swap places with Sweden and do precisely the
opposite of what Sweden considers to be the right
course of action to deal with its demographic crisis.
It is far better to continue on the correct path of
funded private pensions that Germany has taken
with the Riester reform and to make the necessary
pension reductions in the pay-as-you-go system in
accordance with the underlying causes.
In more definite terms, the necessary pension reduc-
tions should be made inverse to the number of the
contributor’s children,and as compensation the reduc-
tions should be cushioned by partial funding along the
Riester model. Only those who raise children truly
make a contribution to assuring the size of their pen-
sions. Those who do not raise children can save the
money which parents spend on bringing up their chil-
dren and can invest it in the financial markets in order
to offset the pension cuts in the pay-as-you-go system.
Although such a reform must not affect already built-
up pension claims, the new pension claims created by
additional contributions can be graduated inversely to
the number of the contributor’s children. If the new
pension formula is announced early on, young people
would be free to make a choice between children and
a supplementary private pension. The constitutional
court has shown itself to be open to such a reform and
has rejected the opinion that it represents a differenti-
ation of pensions which is alien to the system.17
The growing financial burdens on the welfare state
to be expected in view of the unsolved pension prob-
lems already make Germany an increasingly unat-
tractive location for investors. Investors who wish to
settle or stay in Germany would have to fear that the
returns on capital will one day be called upon to help
finance the country’s welfare
programs. The call for widening
the basis for assessment of the
pension insurance system to the
entire value added, is heard all
too well by entrepreneurs and investors. It con-
tributes to a climate of redistribution which is hostile
to investment and encourages investors to look else-
where.
The ageing of the German population will mean a
decline in the country’s economic dynamism. Young
entrepreneurs who dare to follow new paths will be in
as short supply as young engineers and workers who
are willing to roll up their sleeves and do what needs
to be done. In only 15 years, today’s 40-year olds will
be 55 and will be far more interested in their pensions
than in entrepreneurial activity. All this is already
becoming apparent in Germany’s weak economic
growth and loss of attraction as a business location.
The failures in economic reunification 
In examining the reasons for Germany’s weak
growth,the problem of German reunification cannot
be ignored, for the liabilities of this reunification in
the form of high taxes and national debt exceed any-
thing that was feared at the time. Oskar Lafontaine,
the former finance minister, was ostracised for sug-
gesting that the resulting fiscal burdens could be in
the region of 150 billion deutschmarks in the long
run. In reality, they are now in the order of 1,000 bil-
lion euros, more than twelve times this sum.
The leading politicians of the time had hoped that a
self-sustaining upswing would begin in just a few
years.Their hopes were illusory.To be sure,a tempo-
rary boom did occur until 1996, kindled by the
regional development law. This law was effective
because it subsidised capital costs in eastern
Germany to more than 100 percent.18 But as soon as
this law expired,the boom ended abruptly.Figure 24
17 See for example the ruling of the
Federal Constitutional Court of April 3,
2001 (1BVR 1629/94) on reducing the
contributions to social care insurance for
parents as distinct from employees with-
out children.
18 H.-W. Sinn, “Schlingerkurs: Lohnpolitik
und Investitionsförderung in den neuen
Bundesländern”, in: G. Gutmann (editor),
Die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der ostdeutschen
Wirtschaft, Annual Meeting of the Verein
für Socialpolitik, Jena 1994, Duncker &
Humblot: Berlin 1995, p. 23–60. See also
H.-W.Sinn,“Staggering along.Wages Policy
and Investment Support in East Germany,”
The Economics of Transition 3, 1995,
pp. 403–426.
Figure 24shows that economic growth in eastern Germany has
been lower than in western Germany since 1997.
Rather than narrowing, the gap in economic growth
between eastern and western Germany has widened:
there is no sign of the “flourishing landscapes”which
were to have come in “three, four, or five years”, or
of “self-sustaining growth”, to cite Chancellor Kohl.
As shown in Figure 25, GDP per employable person
in eastern Germany was 60.6 percent of the corre-
sponding western level in 1996. This value has now
dropped to 58.4 percent.Although passable industri-
al growth has now been achieved, it started from the
very low level reached after the collapse of the east
German enterprises. It will take a very long time
before the positive impulses emanating from this
development offset the decline elsewhere. Even the
much-vaunted IT and high-tech clusters in Dresden,
Sömmerda and other locations currently do not even
employ 2 percent of eastern Germany’s labour force.
The high-income high-tech ideology trumpeted by
leading politicians in the east has fed illusions which
blocked the view to an obvious fact:an economy can
only grow and recover on the basis of broad-based
activity across all sectors,and especially the ordinary
and unspectacular activities pursued beyond the
high-tech world described in the glossy brochures.
The main reason for the plight of the east lies again in
labour costs.Wages in eastern Germany are between
65 and 75 percent of western levels while the region’s
aggregate productivity fails to reach even 60 percent.
These figures do not match. High wages are incon-
testably the main reason for east Germany’s lack of
competitiveness and for its comparatively low growth.
In this context it is instructive to take a look at
Ireland. As was shown in Figure 15, in 2001 Irish
hourly rates of pay were some 60 percent of west
German ones, even below the
east German level. Despite this,
Irish GNP per capita already
exceeds the German average sig-
nificantly, as was shown in
Figure 3. This illustrates quite
clearly how wrong the armies of
lay preachers are who believe
that high wages promote growth.
Convergence and productivity
adjustment can only take place if
wages follow economic perfor-
mance,and not if they precede it,
as happened in east Germany
after reunification.Only if wages
follow economic performance
can companies expect to earn
the profits which induce them to make the invest-
ments indispensable to economic growth.
Preceding wage increases resulted from the fact
that, long before privatisation, west German com-
petitors had stipulated in long-term bargaining
agreements concluded in 1991 how much the east
German companies should pay their employees.
From the outset, they wanted to prevent potential
foreign investors from acquring east German com-
panies in order to operate them with labour costs
only a third of west German levels and subse-
quently overrun west German markets.They there-
fore thought it necessary to bring eastern wages up
to western levels as quickly as possible. It is obvi-
ous that this strategy has worked only too well.
The shambles of this policy can be seen today. In
the current economic downturn, east Germany
accounted for an over-proportionate number of
bankruptcies (see Figs. 7 and 26).The current crisis
of the German banking system has been caused
largely by loans to east German companies which
are now non-performing.
As a result of the effective halt of investment caused
by the high wage settlements,unemployment rates in
some east German regions have reached 20 percent
and more, and the number of employees paying
social contributions is declining constantly.Figure 27
shows the recent acceleration in the decline
observed since 1994. Employment in eastern Ger-
many (as measured by social security statistics) has
been falling by almost 2 percent annually.
There has been no social unrest and the situation
remains politically under control because incomes in
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eastern Germany have reached a relatively high
level thanks to extensive transfers of social benefits.
Nominally, net household incomes now average
some 80 percent of the west German level if wages,
pensions and all social benefits are included.19
Indeed, because of the low costs of many goods,
especially rents, incomes in real terms are even 90
percent of the west German level.Pensions alone are
a nominal 110 percent of their west German equiva-
lent per pensioner (in real terms: 120 percent). This
favourable development is only in part the merit of
East German economic performance. It has also
been sustained by the still rising level of the transfer
of resources via the public budget.
The absorption of goods and services by the public
sector, investors and private households in eastern
German states greatly exceeds their own production.
The Ifo Institute estimates absorption at about r365
billion, whereas local production is valued at only
r253 billion (Fig. 28). This represents a huge current
account deficit of r113 billion. About r85 billion of
this deficit is financed by public transfers, and about
r28 billion is accounted for by private capital flows
from western to eastern Germany. However, part of
the latter also goes into government bonds raising east
German debt per capita far above the western level.20
Eastern Germany is a transfer economy whose con-
sumption is largely financed by a shift of resources
from western Germany.Every third euro spent there
on final goods comes from the west, either as a uni-
lateral transfer or as loans in the form of a flow of
private capital.
Figure 29 compares the east German situation with
that of other countries and regions. The region’s
absorption surplus or current account deficit is
45 percent of GDP.This is very much higher than in
other regions, such as Italy’s southern regions, the
Mezzogiorno, where this figure
is only 13 percent, or Israel and
Portugal, where it is about
12 percent. There has probably
never been another region in
history which was dependent to
such a high degree on an inflow
of resources from other areas.
Incidentally, these circumstances
again confirm impressively what
Figure 26
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Figure 27
19 See W. Meister and W. Nierhaus,
“Einkommensverteilung in Ostdeutsch-
land”, Ifo Schnelldienst 54, 2001, No. 24,
pp. 60–63.
20 Cf. H. Seitz, Zur Nachhaltigkeit der
Finanzpolitik der Bundesländer, draft ver-
sion, February, European University
(Frankfurt/Oder) and ZEI (Bonn), 2002,
p. 33,Table III.1.
Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (2002).
Figure 28has already been said on the role played by wages as a
purchasing-power and cost factor. The purchasing
power of the east German states exceeds their own
output by almost 50 percent. According to the pur-
chasing-power theory of wages, its economy should
really be flourishing and there should be no employ-
ment problems. But precisely the opposite is true. For
whereas the demand of the new German citizens, fed
by their high purchasing power,is distributed over the
whole world,their high labour costs remain tied to the
local economy scaring away potential investors. The
consequence is unemployment combined with a com-
paratively high standard of living.
The economic reunification of Germany has been a
disastrous failure. A fateful mixture of economic-
policy naivety and selfish abuse of power by unions
and employer organisations has heavily mortgaged
Germany’s economic future.
The political implications
The fall of the Iron Curtain, globalisation, the euro
and many other factors have irrevocably aggravated
Germany’s competitive position. High labour costs
have already largely choked off the upswing in east-
ern Germany and are now threatening to do the
same in the western part of the country.These costs
owe their origin to decisions made in tax, wage and
social policies which seemed to be reasonable at the
time but can no longer be justified from today’s
point of view. Germany’s economic policy needs a
course correction by changing
the underlying institutional con-
ditions.
As already explained, it would be
helpful if the European Central
Bank were to refrain from pursu-
ing an excessively restrictive
monetary policy. It would be
problematic if the bank were to
set targets for average European
inflation so ambitious as to drive
Germany into deflation. But eas-
ing monetary policy alone is by no
means sufficient. In addition, fun-
damental reforms of the German
economic system must be carried
out to solve the home-grown
problems described earlier.
As was pointed out above, low economic growth is
associated with rising unemployment. Unemploy-
ment reflects the country’s inability to attract invest-
ment. It is the result of the labour-cost-raising poli-
cies of previous decades which caused valuable
investment capital to leave the country or diverted it
into excessively capital-intensive and labour-saving
production processes.But unemployment simultane-
ously implies the under-utilisation of a valuable eco-
nomic resource. People who could create something
meaningful are prevented from making use of their
skills by the lack of jobs.That is why growth policies
must start with employment policies. Germany must
again be made attractive for investment which cre-
ates jobs and the incentive to invest in excessively
capital-intensive manufacturing processes must be
reduced.This is the only way of ensuring the desired
boost in growth.
It seems that the simplest thing to do would be to
ease the tax burden on labour, which currently pro-
duces a high degree of wait-and-see and an incentive
to work in the underground economy. The problem
with this approach, however, is that the funds which
will then be lacking in the public budget will no
longer be available to cushion the social conse-
quences of the country’s economic plight. If
Germany were not constrained by the Maastricht
deficit criterion, tax cuts could be financed in
advance and one could hope that the country would
develop enough economic punch for at least a part
of the initial tax shortfalls to be recovered.But this is
no longer an option. The deficit cannot be raised.
Reduced public spending is now the only alternative
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way of financing tax cuts. Subsidies, which exceed
r100 billion, and social security expenditures, which
amount to r664 billion,are prime candidates for lin-
ear cuts. Even small percentage cuts would greatly
help the budget. The political resistance to such a
course would be considerable, however.
Quite apart from this, an attempt can and must be
made to spur the economy by structural reforms
which do not affect the budget. A side-effect of
such reforms would be rising tax revenues which
would then allow further tax cuts to produce a sec-
ondary acceleration effect.
Almost all economists concur in insisting that such
structural reforms must start with wage and welfare
policies aimed at breaking up rigid wage structures
and even reducing labour costs.21 Irrespective of pos-
sible differences of detail,a large consensus now pre-
vails among economists as to what must be done to
put the German economy back on a growth path.
Reform of wage bargaining 
Germany’s collective-bargaining law with its in-
dustry-wide wage accords, which was long regard-
ed as exemplary by many economists, at the latest
lost its innocence by being abused in east Ger-
many. The industry-wide wage accord comes per-
ilously close to a cartel agreement which allows the
unions to ban competition among workers and
firms and to effectively fix prices.Like every cartel,
the wage cartel also tries to push through quota
restrictions while keeping prices high. Unemploy-
ment is the result.
In the urgently needed reform of wage bargain-
ing, priority must be given to reformulating the
industry-wide wage agreement regulated by Art.
77 (3) of the Company Constitution Law
(BetrVG). According to prevailing law, the nego-
tiated wage rate applies in principle to all compa-
nies belonging to the employers’ association and
cannot be altered at company level.This presents
a problem for companies on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. For even if the majority of employees of
such a company were willing to accept a cut in pay
to save the company, they would not be permitted
to do so.
An example from the recent past is the bankrupt-
cy of the Philipp Holzmann company. Its employ-
ees wanted to avoid this outcome by taking wage
cuts but were not allowed to do so. Interestingly,
not only the union but also the employers’ associ-
ation came out against such a step.Apparently the
company’s competitors had the upper hand. The
events connected with the Philipp Holzmann case
had little in common with the behaviour one
might have expected in a competitive situation
between the supply and demand sides of the
labour market.
In a judgment on clauses referring to rates of pay
below those fixed by collective-bargaining agree-
ments (JZ 2000, 42), the Federal Constitutional
Court ruled that the objective of fighting unem-
ployment had constitutional priority.As the loss of
jobs due to bankruptcy can be avoided by includ-
ing opt-out clauses in the wage agreements at com-
pany level,the guarantee of freedom of association
enshrined in the German Constitution must not be
interpreted such that bargaining agreements de
facto assume the character of cartel accords
backed by the state.
In order to avoid a future repetition of the
deplorable circumstances which pushed Holz-
mann into bankruptcy, the bargaining parties’
right to veto individual company agreements
(Art. 77 (3) BetrVG) should be abolished and the
collective-bargaining law should contain the bind-
ing stipulation that every wage agreement must
have an effective opt-out clause. This clause must
be formulated to permit the majority of the work
force to come to an agreement with the company
management and the employee council to opt out
of specific wage and working-time stipulations of
the nationwide bargaining agreement. Such a
decentralisation of decision-making powers in
bargaining agreements would considerably
strengthen bargaining autonomy because the pref-
erences of the local employees concerned would
be expressed much more effectively than is cur-
rently the case.22
21 Cf. German Council of Economic Advisors for Appraising
Aggregate Economic Developments,: “Twenty points for employ-
ment and growth”, Annual Report 2002/03, November 2002.
Advisory Council to the Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology, Appraisal Report: Reform of the welfare state to pro-
mote employment in the low-skilled labour sector, August 2002.
Documentation of the Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology No. 512. German economic research institutes, Joint
forecast: the state of the global and German economies in autumn
2002, October 2002.
22 On this point and in the following see also W. Franz, M.J.M.
Neumann and H.-W.Sinn,“Mehr Beschäftigung durch umfassende
Arbeitsmarktreform”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Septem-
ber 23, 2002, No. 221, p. 17.Opt-out clauses are not only required in the long
term to ensure the adjustment of wage structures
which can make Germany competitive again. In the
current economic climate they must also be under-
stood as an acute emergency measure. At present,
the number of bankruptcies is rising month by
month, and with them the number of non-perform-
ing loans which are driving the German commercial
banks into crisis.The immediate modification of the
Company Constitution Law with the aim of intro-
ducing company opt-out clauses could probably still
prevent many bankruptcies at the last minute.
Other regulations which aim to extend the range of
application of the industry-wide bargaining agree-
ments must also be abrogated, at least during the
period of mass unemployment.Thus the effect of the
bargaining agreement should lapse when a company
leaves the employers’ association and declarations of
general application should no longer be issued by
the Minister of Labour.Laws obliging the bargaining
parties to honour collective agreements of the kind
discussed and partially introduced at state level,can-
not be tolerated because they prevent fair competi-
tion between the suppliers of labour and specifically
also discriminate against east German suppliers of
labour. The so-called favourability principle
(Art. 4 (3) Collective-Bargaining Law) must be
interpreted differently than in the past.According to
current rulings, it cannot be “more favourable” for
an employee to accept lower wages even if he saves
his company or his job by doing so. This narrow
interpretation of the principle must be abandoned.It
must be understood to mean that unemployed per-
sons may negotiate entry-level wages for a limited
period and that already employed workers have the
right to reduce the risk of losing their jobs by mak-
ing concessions on wages and working hours.
Furthermore, the unemployed should be allowed to
accept temporary employment of significantly
longer duration than is the case today, and employ-
ees should be allowed to agree to reduced employ-
ment protection in return for higher remuneration
or higher compensation for dismissal.
All these are obvious economic implications of the
contractual freedom which should be granted in a
market economy as a matter of principle. The fact
that at present the German legal system has
excluded them merely shows how far this system
has moved away from the reasonable rules of eco-
nomics and how large the backlog of necessary
reforms is.
Reform of the welfare state
Even more important than the reform of bargain-
ing policy is a fundamental reform of the welfare
state. The welfare state was created to prevent
poverty, but in practice it works specifically to pre-
vent the poverty caused by unemployment.
Government benefits are available to those who
are not working and not to those who are working.
The government pays wage replacement in the
form of unemployment compensation, unemploy-
ment assistance and supplementary welfare bene-
fits. Early retirement options can also be interpret-
ed in a broad sense as a wage replacement policy.
The problem of social welfare based on wage
replacement is that these benefits themselves pro-
duce the unemployment whose consequences they
are designed to cushion. That is because wage
replacement benefits generate minimum wage
claims against the market economy,as almost no-one
is willing to work for a wage which is less than the
income granted by the state for not working, and
these claimed minimum wages, because of their low
productivity, often exceed what employers are able
to pay.
The maximum wage that an employer can pay with-
out making a loss is the value added that the employ-
ee can produce.In contrast,wage replacement bene-
fits represent the minimum wage for which an
employee is prepared to work. If an employee’s
potential value added is below or insufficiently
above this benefit, no jobs will be offered. Because
of their low productivity, people who fall into this
category can simply not be employed under the pre-
vailing system of social welfare. Consequently, the
system of wage replacement benefits must be called
into question if any headway is to be made in tack-
ling unemployment.
The prevailing situation can be illustrated with the
help of a simple labour market as shown in
Figure 30. The red line is the demand for labour
curve of the firms. It represents the potentially
available jobs together with the value added which
the employees can produce in them. The curve is
downward sloping because the potential jobs are
arranged according to their value added. A firm
only creates jobs which are economically viable,i.e.
whose labour costs are less than their potential
value added.The position of the blue line indicates
the existing potential labour force.
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In the absence of state intervention, a competitive
labour market generates a wage rate at which the
number of profitable jobs (demand for labour) is
exactly equal to the number of people looking for
work (supply of labour). In the diagram, this wage
rate is represented by the intersection G of the
demand and supply curves. If the wage rate is lower,
the number of profitable jobs exceeds the available
volume of labour so that wages will be bid up to com-
petitive levels by the employers who wish to fill them.
If, in contrast, the wage rate is higher, the number of
profitable jobs drops below the number of people
who wish to fill them. The result is unemployment,
employees will bid against each other and labour
costs fall until the number of profitable jobs rises to
the level of the potential labour force. Left to itself,
therefore, the labour market, in which the various
partners act competitively, is free of unemployment.
This ideal situation of the labour market is disturbed
by a welfare state which pays wage replacement ben-
efits. Because the net wage after all deductions must
be sufficiently above the wage replacement level to
offset the loss of this payment as well as the possible
inconvenience of working (or the loss of illicit earn-
ings), the net wage and thus the labour costs are
pushed up. It is now no longer possible for the
employees to underbid each other to work for lower
wages.This would no longer be worthwhile, as wage
replacement income is available to them as an alter-
native.The tendency for wages to fall,which normal-
ly occurs in the event of unemployment, is blocked.
Unemployment is caused by the wage replacement
benefits themselves.
Unemployment means a loss of
output. The resulting loss in
GDP is symbolised by the yel-
low area in Figure 30, which
represents the potential value-
added produced by all those
additional people who would
have been employed in an
undisturbed or free labour
market. This area represents
the loss in output to be expect-
ed from the repercussions of
the welfare state, or vice-versa
the gain in output which would
have been achieved if unem-
ployment had been eliminated.
In reality, the insidious effects of
wage replacement benefits on the
labour market are concentrated on the sector of low-
skilled workers. Figure 31 shows that the problem of
unemployment in Germany is largely a problem of
those without vocational training. The unemployment
rate in this sector has risen from 5 percent to 20 percent
within 25 years.In contrast,those with vocational qual-
ifications and university graduates have experienced
only a modest rise in unemployment.
Unskilled workers make up over 40 percent of the
unemployed in Germany, although their share of
all those gainfully employable is only 15 percent.
That is why measures to combat unemployment
must in the first place start with those having a low
level of qualifications.
The Ifo Institute has estimated how many of
Germany’s low-skilled workers could be placed in
Figure 30
Figure 31jobs.23 This group of workers is found among the reg-
istered unemployed, those participating in job-cre-
ation (ABM and SAM) schemes and recipients of
welfare benefits. In sum, the potential for additional
employment of hitherto unemployed low-skilled
workers can be put at 2.7 million people.If 20 percent
frictional unemployment is deducted from this figure,
a total of 2.3 million remains. Germany must endeav-
our to change the social welfare system in such a way
that jobs can be created for these 2.3 million people
over the long term.
The options available to political action can be best
demonstrated on the basis of welfare benefits. In
fact, welfare benefits can be seen as the essential
reason for unemployment because, in contrast to
unemployment compensation and unemployment
assistance, they put an absolute wage floor into the
entire wage structure and thus prevent the neces-
sary differentiation of wages at the lower end of
the scale. However, very similar considerations
also apply in principle to unemployment compen-
sation and unemployment assistance.
Figure 32 shows how close the level of welfare benefits
is to actual wage income and how strong the forces
must be which set the floor of the wage structure.
Average gross earnings in the low-wage sector are rep-
resented by the red horizontal line, while the yellow
areas show the deductions.In principle,the deductions
consist of the employee contributions to social securi-
ty and personal income tax less any supplementary
social welfare as well as other state benefits which are
paid to low earners depending on their family circum-
stances. The blue columns show the compensation
claims in the form of welfare benefits and housing
allowances if the persons concerned do not work.The
white areas represent income in excess of welfare.The
figure shows clearly that net income in excess of wel-
fare is extremely small in all cases. If one assumes that
a month consists of 150 working hours, one can calcu-
late the effective hourly wage rates corresponding to
this income in excess of welfare.Singles would earn an
effective hourly wage of r2.50 by joining the labour
market, couples without children would earn r1.11,
and couples with one child r0.88. Couples with two
children would earn an extra r1.48 and couples with
three children r0.81.Obviously,it is not worthwhile to
switch from social benefits to regular paid work for
such small sums. Illicit work is the consequence.
Therefore,these wage classes are not occupied to a sig-
nificant degree by people who are
entitled to draw social welfare
benefits. If such low-paid jobs are
filled at all, it is largely by spous-
es, students and pensioners, all of
whom are not entitled to the
alternative of welfare benefits.
The problem is presented from
a somewhat different angle in
Figure 33. This shows the net-
income curve for a family with
two children in Germany as a
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Ochel and M. Werding., “Aktivierende
Sozialhilfe – Ein Weg zu mehr Beschäf-
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function of gross earnings from gainful employ-
ment. Up to gross earnings of r1,660 net income
practically does not change at all in response to
changes in gross earnings.At first a little more net
income is obtained if one earns more gross, but
there follows a long horizontal section in which
net income remains unchanged as gross earnings
increase. The reason is that the marginal rate of
deduction of transfers reaches 100 percent there.
For every extra euro earned, the employee loses
one euro in welfare benefits. The curve begins to
rise only when welfare payments cease, which is
the case at r1,660. From here on employee con-
tributions to social security and income taxes
drive a wedge between gross and net income.
Now, higher performance and higher gross earn-
ings do in fact translate into more net income.
The implications of this situation for the labour
market are illustrated in Figure 34. Here the axes
of the previous diagram are transposed:net income
is now plotted on the abscissa and gross income on
the ordinate. It is obviously everyone’s endeavour
to maximise their net income. But to do so, one
must work more in order to increase one’s gross
earnings. This is like climbing a mountain. The
institutional structures of the welfare state gener-
ate the vertical edge shown in the diagram. The
aspiring employee must climb this “North Face of
the Eiger”in order to gain a foothold on the labour
market. However, many people are unable to do
this. Only after having overcome this steep section
do they succeed in moving further to the right in
the diagram where they increase their net income
by earning a higher gross income.
Figure 35 shows the same situation in a more prosa-
ic form by depicting the entire curve of marginal
deductions for our typical employee levied by the
German tax and transfer system. It can be seen that
the average employee must bear a marginal deduc-
tion of about 65 percent. This corresponds to the
result already presented above. In the particularly
problematic segment of welfare benefits, marginal
deductions reach 100 percent across wide areas.
In May 2002, the Ifo Institute developed a model
of activating social welfare which avoids these
problems. Its core elements are presented in
Table 2 and Figure 36.According to these, second-
tier unemployment benefits and basic welfare ben-
efits should be combined and reduced far below
today’s welfare levels, by about
30 percent for a family with two
children. For those capable of
gainful employment, basic
social welfare will now only
cover the housing allowance at
its present level plus child ben-
efits independent of income.
Anything beyond this will only
be available as remuneration
for work. Up to a monthly
income of r200, only employer
contributions but no employee
contributions will need to be
paid. The employer contribu-
tions will be reimbursed to the
employee up to an income of
r200 in the form of an income-
Figure 34
Figure 35tax credit. The reimbursement will be constant in
the income segment from r200 to r400, and the
basic welfare benefit will not be reduced up to this
point. After this, at higher incomes, both the reim-
bursement and the basic welfare benefit will be
gradually phased out and finally carried over to the
income tax schedule so that the marginal deduc-
tions resulting from taxation, social contributions
and loss of transfer payments remain constant.
In the aggregate, this scheme results in a net
income curve rising in line with gross earnings
(Fig. 36).A higher net income is always achieved if
more gross income is earned. Figuratively speak-
ing, as illustrated in Figure 37, the overhang on the
North Face of the Eiger has been blown off and the
falling material has been used to build a gentler
slope which may actually be climbed.
The change in the tax and transfer system described
above will dramatically invigorate the labour mar-
ket, not only by increasing incentives to work but
mainly because the wage floor in
the pay scale largely disappears.
Those who do not work receive
only a low level of welfare bene-
fit, and those who work do not
lose this benefit but even get it
topped up to a certain level.
There will no longer be any eco-
nomic reason to reject low-wage
jobs. On the contrary, there will
be an incentive to accept such
jobs because the employee then
becomes entitled to income-tax
credits.
Calculations by the Ifo Institute
show that wages in the low-wage
sector would drop by about a
third as a result of this scheme.
Companies and private households will then offer
more jobs which had previously been unprofitable for
employers because of high wage demands. Up to
2.3 million additional jobs may well be created in the
long term, which would translate into a 1.9 percent
increase in GDP.
As shown in Figure 36,the system is designed in such
a way that, despite the expected wage reduction, an
employee working half-time in the private sector will
already earn an income from the sum of his earned
income, the earned income tax credit and social wel-
fare that is as high as today’s welfare benefit. And
those who work full-time in the private sector will
earn significantly more than that.





The Ifo model of activating social welfare
1. Harmonising second-tier unemployment assis-
tance and basic welfare benefit payments by
the local authorities
2. Reduction of basic social welfare (only housing
allowance and child allowance independent of
income) by about one third
3. Income tax credits for those employed in the
private sector, like the US Earned Income Tax
Credit, and larger income range where basic
welfare is not reduced
4. Old level of welfare benefit as income earned
from loan employment organised by the local
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Despite the expected positive effect of this change
in the welfare benefit towards an activation of the
labour market, not all those concerned are expect-
ed to find jobs in the short term and perhaps also
in the long term.Some time will certainly be need-
ed for companies and private households to react
to the new situation.The question then arises as to
how we can make sure that these people’s income
does not fall below their previous level of welfare
benefits.The answer given in the Ifo model is that
those who fail to find a job in the private sector
will be offered an alternative in the public sector.
They can earn an income equal to today’s welfare
benefit if they undertake to make themselves
available to the public sector for a loan-employ-
ment scheme which in principle would already be
possible under current law. They would be given
an employment contract with their local communi-
ty, which then has the right to hire out their ser-
vices to the private sector on the basis of fee con-
tracts via private loan-employment agencies. As
long as the fee paid for their services is greater
than zero, it is more efficient to take this route
than to spend public money without getting any
work in return. The loan-employment proposal
has been accepted by the Hartz Commission and
has subsequently also become popularised in pub-
lic discussions.
The living conditions of the former recipients of
welfare will of course become somewhat less com-
fortable if they remain in the public sector and
must work there. This is an intended effect which
aims to nip illicit work in the bud. However, it
should be stressed that those concerned will nor-
mally earn more from the sum of public money and
their earned income than they currently obtain
from welfare benefits. And this does not even
mean extra costs for the public budget. To this
extent, the proposal represents a gain in efficiency
which results from the gainful employment of
those who were previously unemployed. The stan-
dard of living of the poorer sections of the popula-
tion is then substantially improved.
In addition, those concerned have an incentive to
obtain qualifications, to make greater efforts and
to leave the low-income sector as soon as possible
by going for better-paid jobs.The current situation
in the low-wage sector in the Federal Republic of
Germany is so hopelessly inefficient that it would
be easy to devise a reform which would produce
improvements for all concerned.
The calculations underlying this proposal were
made on a very cautious basis.Although relatively
pessimistic assumptions were made about the free-
rider effects of the program and its possible mobil-
isation effects, it does not involve any additional
costs for the the public budget. Under more opti-
mistic assumptions, it will even yield budget sur-
pluses. In addition, the growth effect will be signif-
icantly larger than calculated because the calcula-
tion did not take into account the fact that the
change in wage determination practices associated
with the implementation of the proposal would
lead to an increased willingness to invest in
Germany.
It may be added that this proposal has been accept-
ed with only minor modifications both by the
Advisory Council to the Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomics and by the German Council of Economic
Advisors.24 It is now time to implement it.
Conclusion
Germany’s poor growth performance and unat-
tractiveness for investors have reached ominous
dimensions. Unemployment has risen for thirty
years and growth is stymied. In terms of per capita
income, Germany is being successively overtaken
by one EU country after another. The euro has
deprived the German economy of the interest-rate
advantage which it had enjoyed under the protec-
tion of the deutschmark, and the economic failure
of German reunification continues to be a serious
burden on the country. Only little time is left
before the progressive ageing of the population
depletes the country of the energy required for a
new upswing. Japanese conditions have not yet
arrived, but they are looming on the horizon. The
growing number of bankruptcies and the banking
crisis are inauspicious harbingers of the problems
which may yet eventuate. The European Central
Bank has the responsibility to protect Germany
from deflation, but such a policy alone is by no
means sufficient to get the country back on its feet.
National measures to revive economic growth
must in the first instance start with employment.
In the medium term there is no alternative to
mobilising the labour market. Growth can be
attained by more employment, because more
24 Cf. Advisory Council to the Federal Ministry of Economics, op.
cit. and German Council of Economic Experts, op. cit., p. 372 ff.employment means more output and because
employment growth would be an unmistakable
sign that it is once again worthwhile to invest in
Germany.
Apart from rents, labour costs are practically the
only company costs which are linked to location.
For this reason, a strategy which makes Germany
competitive again in the medium term and gener-
ates new investment must begin with labour costs.
Other possibilities which might contribute to a
solution of Germany’s problems have been largely
exhausted or would come too late. Educational
reform must certainly be initiated in order to over-
come the poor showing in the PISA comparison,
but one should not be under any illusions.
Educational reform will only bear fruit in the very
long term, after one generation.
The centrepiece of a meaningful policy of reviving
the labour markets is a reform of the collective-bar-
gaining law and of the welfare state, as both ele-
ments are responsible for the wage rigidity which is
the main cause of German unemployment. The sys-
tem of nationwide wage agreements must be relaxed
by adding company opt-out clauses and must be
reduced to a system of wage guidelines to apply until
an alternative is agreed at company level by a major-
ity vote. Partial decentralisation of the bargaining
process would strengthen bargaining autonomy and
eliminate the whiff of cartel accords.
The welfare state must be successively transformed
from a system of wage replacement payments to a
system of wage supplements. The watchword must
be that everyone should work according to his abil-
ities, at whatever wage this is possible. If the wage
level does not correspond to the expectations of
society, the state must top it up so that the desired
income is achieved from the sum of earned income
and public moneys. It is inefficient as well as con-
temptuous of human beings to make the support
provided by the community available only under
the condition of being idle, as is the case in Ger-
many today. The step from a welfare state that
keeps people passive rather than encouraging
them to be active is long overdue.
The aim is not to dismantle the welfare state but to
transform it so that everyone can find his place in
society without being condemned to inactivity.
Everyone should be able to play a productive part
in the division-of-labour economy so that he earns
the recognition of the wider community. If this aim
is reached, Germany will gain ground again.
The reforms of labour law and the welfare state
cannot be delayed. In 2004 the borders of the EU
will be opened to 75 million Central and East
Europeans, and no administrative barrier will then
be able to stem the forces of competition. German
companies will be up against a growing number of
low-wage competitors, capital will migrate to the
low-wage economies to the east and economic
migrants will enter the country. Under present cir-
cumstances considerable labour market problems
must be expected, in particular a rapid rise in
unemployment in Germany. The east German
economy is particularly exposed to these phenom-
ena. It is in danger of being crushed between the
high-productivity economy in the west and the
low-wage regions of the east.There is only one way
to reduce these dangers and that is by making the
labour market more flexible by implementing mar-
ket-based reforms. How this can be done has been
presented here.
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